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ABSTRAGr

Basic to the development of featherbedding are the fear of
displacement and resistance to the use of the machine.

Featherbedding

grew out of an environment of violence in which destruction of machinery was frequent, and represents a more civilized (sic) manner by
which workers can protect their employment opporttmities.

Since the

plight of workers affected by technological change concerns many groups
of workers in the economy, different attitudes to.Ia.rd displacement and
technological change are examined in this study.
Clearly apparent is the fact that featherbedding is part of the
larger problem of technological displacement •. As industrial and governmental techniques and programs reduce the fears 1-mich workers have of
new machineX"J, featherbedding will also decline.

Although it may be

true that craft unionism must bear some of the blame for ma.lee-work
practices and attitudes, generally the best method of ridding industry.

of this practice is to tackle the overall problem of displacement by
ptomoting practices that increase job security.

l

INTRODUCTION
t1Feathe:rbeddihg111 or ·work restriction is 2.-·subJect :ceceiving

much attention; yet it is little understood--fonnal analysis being
limited to

versJ recent times,

labo1·-managenent disputes,

It is often the most volatile issue in

J.!anagement is almost certain to attempt to

obtain public support and to put pressure upon the unions by cl2.ir,1ing
that the bargaining demands of management are desig,ned only to put an
end to featherbedding..

'I'his is a claim of v:i--~ue against sin and .is

usually successful in influencing public opinion.

The significance of

public opinion in the settleraent of labor-management di,iputes is subject,
however, to considerable argunent.
It is not necessary to have all members of a union lLD.employed
before the union is confronted with the question of its extinctio·n as
a viable institution, 2

Therefore, the ef:forts of unions to

11

malm-,rork"

by various methods, direct _and indirect, may be attributed primarily
to the insecurity of employment in modern industry,
The wage earner lives in a world 1-Jhere the demand for labor is
1 The ,;-rord "feathe~bedding 11 refers to practices or -work rules
which s8t unreasonable l:L~its to the runollllt of uor~: employees may do in
a given time. It also includes pa;:7rnents for unneed.ed workers, unnecos'....
sarJ tasks, 1-Tork not pGrfoI'El.ed or jobs duplicating those already done.
Hore specifically and appro,,riately it neans resistance by labor to the
introduction of better techniques of production and more efficient
types of machinery. The l'!ord, therefore, connotes contemptible behavior
because it is associated with economic uaste of resources and an unacceptable norm of conduct. It is used interchangeably with 11make-uork 11 and
11 restrictive output 11 •
21·,Jeinstein, Pc~ul A., Featherbedding arid Tcchnologica.l Cho..n:;e,
D. C. Heath Co,, 1965, P• v.

2

· constantly changing in ciuantity, kind and location.

In a dyn2Inic

II

!
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economy--one in t·Ihich changes in technology and in the demand for
various l.::inds of goods and services create a changing demand for labor

in each industry, occupation, or locality--a substantial degre2 of job
mobility is needed to achieve full utilization of the labor force a.nd
to enable the economy to operate at full capacity, 3 On the other hand,
the individual employer or employee is often more interested in job
security and stability,

The employer prefers stability because it means

the costs of hiring and training ne1-1 workers are kept dmm,

To the

employee, stability means relative freedom from job losses or layoffs
and protection of his invested equity in fringe benefits,
A survey of job attachment in January 1966 provides information
on one aspect of mobility--the length of time that workers had been
continuously employed on the job they held at the time of.the survey.
Data indicate that employees staded 1rith the same job or employer an
average of 4,2 years, 4 However, seasonal fluctuaticns in demand may
cause even regular employees to lose many days of work and to enjoy
less than full time employment,

Considerable unemployment is caused,

even in good times, by technological innovations, changes in dema.nd,
and geographical shifts in industry.
Since employment is uncertain and fluctuating, and much of it
of short duration, it is not surprising that wage earners, both organized and unorganiz3d, seek to stabilize and extend their periods of
employment by controlling the pace of work.

Unions also seek to improve

311Job Mobility in 1961, 11 Honthly Labor Reyj ew, August, 1963,
PP• 897-906,

411 Job

Tenure· o.f Workers,- January l966 11 , Honthly Labor Review,

January 1967, p. 31,

3
the employment picture by various mcl:e-work rules and polic.ies.

Er;rployers, well aware of the 1·rorkers' fear of unemployment,
have often tried to foster this fear for such selfish purposes as to
step up the speed of work or to maintain discipline,

The efforts of

management to use fear of unemployment, houever, serve only to strengthen
union attempts to make work,

It is not merely to increase or to protect

immediate employment opportunities that unions use ma..ke-uor!c rules, but
to prolong future emplo:,raent.
From the standpoint of the community, maJrn-1rork 1-u.les are a
,rasteful way of dealing Irlth unemployment caused by sea.sonal worl:,
technological change, and market shifts.

In vie1-r of the large nurnber

of important technological changes in the last several generations, it

is surprising that unions have not been concerned far nore than has been
the case with the problems resulting therefrom.

The re?,son appears to

be that marry of the ch2nges occurred at a tine of rapid eArpansion of-the
economy, which in turn served to roinimize displacement caused by ax1y one
chm1ge, since the displaced. worker could readily find employment else-

1mere.
This study 1-r.i.ll at.tempt to e~'}Jlore the reasons ·why unions, workers,

management, and the public take the attitudes they do to~rard technological advancement.

4

HISTORY OF

11

FEATHEHBEDDING 11

Throughout time the public has often regarded inventors as
criminals and madmen rathe"r than" benefactors of mankind.

In 1579 the

hapless inventor of a Heaving machine was ordered strangled by the
Council of Danzig, on the ground "that his device would reduce many
workers to beggary." John Fitch, inventor of the steamboat, indicated
that he was treated "like a slave" when he appealed to various groups
for financial support.

John Kay, inventor of the flying shuttle in

1733, was forced to leave England; workers entered Hargraves' home in
1768 and destroyed his spinning jennies; and Crompton, who invented the
spinning mule "in 1799, was forced'into hiding"as a reward fer his work.5
Resistance to technological change has never been confined to
class or group.

any

one

Governments, religious groups, farmers, and workers

have at one time or another prevented or impeded introduction of new
innovations.
The acceptance or rejection of technological innovations depends to a large measure on whether they are
introduced at a trne when an economy is static, contracting, or expanding; Hhether they appear in a setting of
social stratification, of anarchic competition ang
class struggle, or in a planned industrial order.
These are factors to remember when speaking about problems of featherbedding, because featherbedding is a form of resistance to technolog5Stern, 11 Resi~tance to the Adoption of Technical Innovations
in Technolodcal Trends and National Policy 39, 55" (National Resources
Committee 1937) ouoted in Heinstein, p. 12.

6Ibid.

5
ical change.
Fewer than 150 years ago the textile uorkers of England were
wrecking revolutionary machines which to them signified nothing but
poverty and degradation. 7 Being unorganized and having no practical
method of securing a hearing of their grievances, they took out their
frustration in this futile and primitive fashion.

It was not the in-

vention of machinery which produced the crisis, but rather the condition
governing exploitation of the machine by the o,mers.

J. L. and B.

Hammond observed that:
If the introduction of machinery had taken place
under a system that allowed the workers to control
it, that system could have increased leisure and
made the life of the people happier: it would in
fact have done ,mat the philosophers claimed for
it. But machinery was introduced under a system
that placed the workers at the disposal of' the
01mers of capital, 1.fno valued machinery as a means,
not to a large and richer life for the' workers,
bu~ grgater and quicker profits for their enterprise.
The harsh experience of the English uas not repeated on the American
scene with the introduction of technological innovation, priimarily
because of the flexible nnd expanding economy of the United States.
Those who were dissatisfied uith their lot had only to look to the
new frontier of the '"''lild West".

Even though the introduction of new

machinery did not take place under the control of the workers, the
system did allow the workers to share more in the economic and social
benefits of the new technology- here than anynhere else in the 1-1orld.
Only recently has the opposition to technological change been signif-

7J. L. and B. Hammond, The Skilled Labourer, 1760-1832, 1 (1919)
as quoted in Sumner H. Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial lfanage
ment, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. (1941).
8
Ibid.

6
icant enough~to arouse public ccncern and, even now, in on}y a feu
trades and industries.
Opposition has taken the form of

11

taxing" the use of new

machines· and techniques rather than preventing its introduction.
There is, however, evidence that through the control of certain basic
patents and other mea..ns of economic pressures, American industry has
prevented or delayed the introduction of new machines or processes.

9

This, ho-'1ever, is a result of business conditions or cycles rather than
a continuing basic philosophy of businessmen.
The factors which motiv2.te the decisions of businessmen and
organized .-,orkers to resist technologictl changes at certain times and
under certain conditions are neither understood nor condoned by the
public.

In America, industrial progress is measured in ~uantitative

terms, i.e., units of output, amount of servic.e available.

Anyone,

whether businessman, or organized, or unorganized worker, who attempts
to curtail or limit the amount of production is considered an enemy of
progress.

Since the opposition of uorkers to technological changes

necessarily assumes forms which are more patent and crude than those of
businessmen, it is only natural that criticism is focused on the workers.
"Featherbedding" has now assumed the connotation of mal-practice, foul
play, a..nd many other names for bad conduct, and some writers believe
this is mainly because of the historical antipathy to unions in this
country.

10
Few words in the lexicon ol: labor are so charged with emotional
9 ueinstein, p. 13.

10\_·Jeins
. t ein,
.
P•

7
content as the so called practice of "featherbedding".

Everybody is

against it, including management, the public, the President, and even
organized labor.

No one denies that waste is evil.

But just what

constitutes featherbeddin1;c?
Everyone is familiar with the charge that the trade-union
organizations have been agencies of propaganda for restriction of
output.

The bricklayers I union, for example, limits the mm1ber of

bricks to be laid each day, and J1_1embers get more money for laying
· 11
fewer bricks than formerly.

plumbers.

Another charge is that made against the·

"The plumber's getting tuo dollars an hour for sleeping

under the bathtub", is a facetious. way· of eJ<..-pressing a generaJ. conviction
regarding the plumber's restriction of output.

Just why brickl2;i·ers 1

and plumbers' unions are used as stock examples of restriction of output is not kn0vm; but indications· are that most people identify restriction of output In.th the trade unions,

!1any writers and authorities on

unionism and industrial relations identify restrictions of output as a
policy of orga.nized labor only, and not of unorganized labor,

This is

far from the truth,
This common habit of associating unions and restriction appears
to have produced a sort of deadening effect to the aches and pains
caused by the restrictive practices of non-union workers.

The popular

indifference to such practices may also be the result of that type of
thinking which associates ever-Jthing evil in industry ,n.th unionism and
ever-Jthing good with non-unionism.

11summer H. Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial Nanagement,
The Brookings Institute, Washington D.C. 1941, P• 192,

8
Restriction of output has many names,

We find such terms as

"ca I Canny and dorg" ( used in Scotland); "conscientious withdrawl of
efficiency," "go easy," "scamping," "skulking" (used in England);
"gold bricking" (in Western United States); "government work, 11 "doing
oneself on company time, 11 "holding bacl{" (in the United States); "sabotage" (in France); "rattening, ". "striking on the job, 11 "soldiering"
( accurate but uncomplimentary), "shirking, 11
the United States).

11

slacking" (in England and

12

Featherbedding is not new,

Some of today's practices origin-

ated in the last quarter of the 19th century,
dimension to the problem.

But now there is a new

The situation of 1-1orkers displaced by new

technology has been aggravated by a slugcish economY,

The union leader's

problem, however is not related to prevailing economic conditions, but
to his own entrenched position,
Although featherbedding is usually discussed in connection
with trade unionism, unorganized workers are just as prone to engage
in restriction of output.

\·Yorkers in industrial society, rego.rdless

of whether or not they are organized, oppose the introduction of new
industrial machinery because it arouses the fear of unemployment, 13
The reaction has varied, however, denending on the state of unionization.

Non-union workers have been more inclined to reach tacit under-

standings and bring social pressures on the members of the work group.
These actions are raore difficult to isolate and identify than formal
rules and contractua1 provisions.
1

'1,Iathewson, Stahley B., "Restriction of Output A.'11ong
Unorganized Workc,rs, 11 Featherbedding and Tc,chnological Change,

P•

4.

l:\/einsteirt, p,

4,

9
·The case which follows indicates how potent a factor for
restriction the pressur.:; of the group may be.
An enthusiastic boy had gone to work in the
autonatic scre11 machine department of a large
manufacturing plant. He had been at nork only
a few days on the sinple job of knocking burrs
off small parts ,·r.i.th an emery 1,neel. One of the
older burr-grinders approached him and said,

"Take it easy, buddy, .there's no hurry,
up a bit,"
\Jlat I s that ? 11 the boy demanded.
piece work,"
11

"Well, don't work so damn fast.
it's healthier."

Slow

"I'm paid
Take my advice;

Later the boy e::q,lained, "I didn •t understand
at the time and I didn't slow up, It was some
ti111e before I learned what prompted this fellow
to attl)mpt to ;_nterfere ,r.i.th my rate of production.14

14,~·.eins
. t ein,
.

P•

5•
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UNION RESPOIJSES '.t'O TECHNOLOGICAL CH.ANGE
J.!ake-uork or featherbedding has been caused for the most
part by che genius of man •. In today's I1orld the technological changes
that affect the Hark force most seem to be the modern trends toward

automation.

11

Automation 11 is defined as a mechanical figure or contri-

vance constructed to act as if spontaneously, without the aid of man.
It would be exceedingly naive to argue th2t automation does·
not abolish jcbs.

There is no doubt that it does,

In a 1955 inquirJ

by a trade periodical, The American ifachinist, 1,57h firms gave their
ansuer to the impact on the work force.

Of the 221~ who indicated some

degree of automation in their plai:its, one-fourth of the firms indicated
an increase in employment by 211;; ,•Jhile another one-quarter stated that
their Hork force was reduced by 16;;.

1 5 In the Ford-Cleveland Plant,

one man runs a .tr211sfer machine ]_::ierfonning more tha..n 500 machining

operations, whereas conventional methods required 35-70 men;

16

and,

in one automated radio plant, two workers can turn out 1,000 radio sets per
day Ilhere formerly 200 men 11ere required •
.Production in the electrical machine:r-J industrJ is 25;'( hir;her
than it was 10 yea:rs ago; with 80,000 fewer employees; and the automobile industr'J can produce 10 million new cars 1,i.t.h a work force of

15

·

Fredrick Pollock, Automation, (Neu York: Frederick Praeger,

1957), P• 209,
16
. Report of the Director Gene-r·e.l, P2~rt T: Automation and Other
Technological Developments, (international Labor Ofi'.ice, 19S7), PP• 9-32.

11
200,000 fmrer than in 1953. 17
It has often been stated that "one man's reci tane
. is another
'
man 1 s due process. 11

It may be sirnilarli asserted that n-what is feather-

bedding to an employer is protection of the property right in a job
the worker and his nnion,

11

.

to

Hany of the work rules that emerge from

collective bargaining gene.rally define l:rhat employers refer to as

11

feather-

bedding".
The conflict betueen the 11orker and emerging nei:,r forms of technology is as old as the Industrial Revolution.
The tmion embodies the dGvelopment of a neH set of property
rights generated withj_n the uomb of an older set of property concepts.
The older set must either repress the developing concepts or adapt to

them by a procGss of accomodation.

Collective bargaining is essentially

an experimentaJ. procedure to reconcile these conflicting property concepts in an evolving social system,
The interpret2~tion of this conflict as a clash of different
property rights perrrU ts a rational vieH of wol'k rules and tlleged

featherbedding. The concept of'a1,rorker's property right in his job
originated as an intellectual fori:tulation in the work ?f John R. Comrilons.
It· received its classic expression from his student, Selig R. PerL11an.
He .r.cote, "The safest way to assure group control over opportnnity. • •
was for the 1J.llion. • • to -become tho virtual m;ner and administrator of
the jobs. 1118

Look,"

l7Russel C, McCarthy, "Automation and Uneuployment: A Second
Jfanagei::ent Rcvieu, Eay, 1962, p. 37.
18

selig R. Perlman, A 'Pheory of 12.bor J.Iovement, (i!ew York:
Augustus Kelley, 19Lr9), p. 199,

12

John R.Commons considered rules to be the ver;r basis of our
economic theory•

Commons used the concept of a working rule in a much

broader sense that it is used in the field of industrial relations
today.

He formulated it as' a guiding concept in explaining the behavior

of all economic institutions including the corporation itself.

He

describes the working rule in the following language:
It ( the working rule) tells 11hat the individual
must or must not do ( compulsion or duty), what they
may do Hithout interference from other individuals
(permission or liberty), ~,hat they caJl do with the
aid of collective pouer (capacity or right) and
what they carinot expect the collective power to do
in their behalf •••• '.forking rules have had a profound effect upon the concept of private property,
changing concept from a principle of exclusive
holding of physical objects for the mmer's private
use into a principle of control of limited resources needed by others for their use and therefore
into a concept of intangible and incorporeal
property arising solely out of rules of law controling transactions.19
John R. Commons concludes that the deprivation of a worker of his job
is the equivalent of the abolition of a property right for which he is
entitled to compensation on the basis of capitalizing the earning
powers of which he is thereby deprived.
Opposition to technological change is such a natural reaction
of those who are immediately injured by the change that considerable
foresight and a careful 1-reighing of consequences are necessary in order

to induce a union to refrain from adopting the obvious and natural
attitude of opposition,

And yet it is inportant to obserlfe that if an

attitude or policy of obstruction is not adopted and if the supply of
l9 John R. Commons, Legal Foundation of Capitalism, (Madison:
University of 'tiisconsin Press, 1957) •

13
labor is,perrnitted-to adjust itself gradually to the change,
the oppostition 1-Jill pass away,

The structual iromrorkers originally

opposed the pneumatic harmner;
,, now the iromrorkers would not think of
opposing it--in fact, most do not knou hou to pound rivets by hand,
Opposition to technological change is more likely to be practiced by craft unions than by industrial unions,

When unions include

only members of a single occupation, a machine or process which displaces men or reduces the required skill injures every member of the
union,

\·ihen the union includes all occupational skills in the industry,

however, too few members are affected by most technological ,changes to
permit the union to raake a major issue of the change,

·~J11ether indust-

rial or craft, unions are composed of men who have a limited time to
live and who are primarily interested, therefore, not in perpetuating
their organization, but in obtai_n~ng within their lifetir,1e a return
on the money they pay as monthly dues,

If, by insisting upon policies

that eventually destroy the union, they can protect their jobs from
destruction for a few years, they t1ay prefer to sacrifice the union in
order to prolong their job·,
This attitude of unionized ,mrkers tow,srd technological progress,
which has led to the imposition of restrictive practices, stems from
various factors,

These include the attitude and behavior of managment,

the satisfaction of employees .,Jith working conditions, the size and type
of union, and the histor"J of the union and its relations 1-Jith other

. t·ions. 20,
1 ab or organiza

Nost important of all, 1mrkers are influenced

by employment conditions in the labor market,

2os1·icnuer,
,~

p. 242,

Nevertheless, there has

been a gradual realization by workers t)lat a proper distribution of
the costs a.nd gains of new technology is the key to improvement of
conditions, and as a result resistance to technological progress has
decreased.

Gains are represented by advances in the standard of living

and more leisure ti.me; costs include the loss of skills and experience,
the need for some displaced workers to find new jobs and shift their
place of residence, and the inability of other employees to adjust.
Evolution in the attitude· and behavior of 110rkers touard the
introduction of new machines has depended in great part on surrounding
circumstances.

The most serious cases of resistance to machinery and

the clearest demonstration of destructive human impulses and mob violence have occurred at those times and places in which workers affected
by the installation Irere faced by a variety of restrictions limiting
their ability to· change trades or move to other locales.

Hore recent-

ly, the greater impact of severe economic depressions, the accumulation

of rightl and privileges under the s-ystems of seniority, and the existence of vested interests in pension funds have made it far less attractive for ·iorkers to seek new jobs or change the place of residence.
Resistanpe to technological advance, although eA1Jressed in much milder
fonns than fonnerly, has again become an important industrial issue.

The question of tpade union l:i.r,1itations on output becar.ie important in the United States near tne beginning of the Twentieth CentlIT'J•
At first, discussion did not revolve around the impact of technology
on the attitudes and activities of workers.

The main concern was whe-

ther the amount of work assigned was overly burdensone and unduly sapped
the physical vitality and stamina of workers, thereby making them
useless to industry in relatively short periods of time.

Generally, it

was not contended that union leaders exerted pressure ·On uorkers to

15
reduce the normal amount of work performed during working hours,
Rather, the labor movement was interested in achieving a reduction in
the daily hours of work, an objective more widely acceptable outside
the wage-earning class,

At, times employers agreed to permit their

workers to produce less in lieu of giving them an increase in wages;
occasionally and possibly for brief intervals strong locals reduced
work loads of their members below reasonable limits,

There are inst-

ances 1-mere unions, such as stone mounters, flint glass workers, .and
iron and steel 110rkers, have tried to avoid a cut in the piece rate
paid to their members by limiting the amount of wages which workers
were allowed to earn in a day.

21

Trade unions generally favored policies limiting output only
to resist the speed-up,

It sometimes happened that employers hired

several able 1wrkmen uho were ,indu?ed by financial arrangements to set
a work pace above the normal capabilities of most uorkers in order to

drive those on the job to greater exertion,

But as the practice of the

speed-up was gradually abandoned by employers, limitation of output
as a union counter measure becmae less important.
Some union opposition to new machiner-y- resulted from unhappy
experiences.

Technological advance made it easier for employers to

institute the speed-up, d,:c,stroyed skills, reduced the demand for labor

in estceblishments using ne1.i devices, and sometL'lle made possible the
employment of women and children.

But even at the beginning of the

T.;entieth CentUFJ, attempts by unions to prevent the use of machines
.wages at least as high as those formerly prevailing,

The typograph-

21
John Hortin, "Do Trade Unions Limit Output? 11 Political
Quarterly, September, 19Q7, P• 371,

16
ers succeeded in this objective.

lfachinists, pressmen, and litho-

graphers, for example, fixed the number of machines each man could

·

operate.

22

.

But the baker's union, predominantly craft in nature, which
had incomplete control of the labor market, did not show hostility to
technoloe:;ical advance.

This union did, however, generally press for

shorter hours in the mechanized sector of the industry.

As machines

replaced hard labor, the organization assumed more of the characteristics of an industrial union.

The advantages uhich workers receive

In

from mechanization have been recognized by the union leadership.

1955, the president of the baker's union said: 'We have 170,000 mer.1bers in the union, ••• but I doubt if 16,000 of them are bakers •••• But
machines, while elimin;iting bakers, reo_uire great numbers of men to
assemble the p;ickaging materials, store and move the products.
exchanged bakers for bchl:ery workers•"

He 1ve

23

In one sector of the labor market, houever, where control was
complete, (control of all employees in a particular competitive area),
the baker's unions resisted technology and practiced featherbedding.
In 1922, the New York State Joint Legislative Conmuttee on Housing
(the Loclrnood Committee) conducted an investigation of the Jewish baker's union in New York City.

It disclosed, among other things, that:

union. policy required that the hours of ,.,ork were to be reduced if
machinery is used in a bakery; employers were to limit the amount of
bread baked each day; and during specified periods employers "must keep

22

Robert D. Leiter, Featherbedding and Job Security, Twayne
Publishers, Inc. New York 1904, p. 57.
2

~ortune, Hay 1955, P• 59.

17
and pay such nur.1be: of men as the union determines even if he has no
work for so many; 11 and bakery- machiner'J was to be operated by Journeymen workers only.

The committee found that these rules drove employers

out of business because th~y were unable to compete with the city's nonJewish bakers who uere not burdened by. similar requirements.

2

4

There are instances in which unions whose nembers are affected
by technological change are not always capable of acting effectively.
This occurs, for example, when new developments or growth in one industry influences employment opportunities in another.

Generally, however,

union attitude tow1rd technologic2.l change takes the form of acceptance
and encouragement, adjustments and control, or opposition and competition.
Accept31lce and Encouragement
A militant employer association and a.militant labor union in
the West Coast shipping industr'J have evolved a novel solution for the
troublesome problem of restrictive working rules that may be far reaching in its ultimate effects.

The employer-..:the Pacific Haritime Assoc-

iation (PHA)--regained a ~igh degree of freedom to manage its operations
efficiently, and established its right to introduce labor saving machinery.

The union--the International Longshoremen 1 s and Warehousemen's

Union (ILWU)--gained sizable payments running into the millions of dollars,
as its "share of the machine" and the assurance of security and a"better
deal" for its longshore members.

2

5

2 1ew York State Joint Legislative Committee on Housing, Final
Report (Legislative Docunents No. 48) 1923, PP• 37-46 as quoted Leiter,

p.

57.

2
5Kossaris, i'J.ax D., "Harking Rules in llest Coast Longshoring,"
Nonthly Labor Revie1-i, ·January, 1961, P• 1.
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In the process of.moving goods, longshoremen ordinarily engage
in duties uhich bridge the gap betHeen the functions of seamen and
teamsters.

The work consists of moving cargo between the dock and the

hatch of ships engaged in foreign intercoastal, and coastal trade.
This work is performed mainly by gangs of men, although some persons
not attached to a gang, such as ·clerks, checkers, carpenters, - and extra
laborers, also are utilized.

Since most of the costs of operating a

vessel, other than fuel, continue to accumulate during the period in
which the vessel is ·docked, profits tend to be larger if turnarounds
are more rapid.

Fluctuations in the demand for longshore l.abor vary

widely from day to day because arrival and departure of ships and
amounts and kinds of cargo to be loaded or unloaded are irregular.
Some casu2J_ employment, therefore, has been a regular feature of the
.industry.
The period following the general strike of 1934, w2-s one of
exploitation and abuse of longshoremen by their employers.

The

bitterness which had characterized the industry carried over into the
subsequent employer-union relationship.

The employers did their best

to brea.\': the union, and the union retaliated just as militantly.
ye:3-rs were probably the stormiest in U.S. 12-bor history.

These

Between 1934

and 1948, the Uest Coast had over 20 major port strikes, more than
300 days of coastwide strikes, about 1,300 local "job action" strikes,
and about 250 arbitration awards.

26

One of the issues settled in the 1934 strike 1-1as the hiring
26
Betty V.H. Schneider and Abraham Siegel, Industrial Relations
in the Pacific Coast Longshore Industry (Berkeley, University of
California, Institute of Industrial Relations, 1956), PP• 2-3.
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hall procedure.

He

Nq longshorem2.n may ,·;ork steadily for one employer.

reports to the hiring hall, ,,here a union-elected dispatcher fills

employer requests tJ1J sending a gang to load or unload a ship.
The

'

15,000 Class A fully registered longshoremen '(and clerks)

who are IL\-iU members are considered the industry I s basic labor force·
·
. ·1 abl e JO
· b s. 27
and have f irs t c.h oice
a t avai

of longshoremen: Class B and Casuals.

There are tuo other classes

\'ihile there are nearly ·as many

CJ.ass Band Casual workers as there are Class A men, the two groups
for only a small fraction of the marlhours uorked (about 14
. 28
in 1959) and not considered part of regular labor force.
Two significant facts evolved in the industry during the period
active warfare between

193h-19h8. One-that the union has complete

control over the longshore labor force on the \-lest Coast.

The long-

shoreman must look to the union for' his job and thus his complete
loyalty is to the union.

The second irksome situation is the double

handling rule ,;hich prevails in most ports.

Under this rule, cargo

must touch the "skin of the dock" before someone other than a longshoreman may h2ndle it,
into a truck, trair,i,

Oi"'

Thus the cargo cannot be unloaded directly
other means of conveyance.

Employers have repeatedly protested e;hat they term

11 the

·progressive and substantial deterioration of longshore productivity",
but to no avail,

They either abided by the rules or their ships were

not worked,

27 Betty V, H, Schneider,
.
"The lfaritime Industry, 11 J.Ionthly
Labor Review, !fay

1959, P• 552,

28.•
l\ossoris, p, 2
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Subsequen~ to the ninety-five day strike of 1948, new management leadership helped to usher in an era of relative peace.

Each side

was well disposed to reduce its financial loss'es.
Realization by the ' union that the volume of work: available to
longshoremen uas declining ·and the.t operating procedures were being
modernized by employers led to a reappraisal of its attitude and policies.

High labor costs on the docks were responsible at least in part

for the shift in freight transport from coastal and intercoastal water
shipments to trucks.and railroads.

In 1957 the u.~ion announced that it

was prepared to forego the advantages of its restrictive ru.les and
to technological change in order to make the industry more
competitive and profitable on the condition that employers permit longshoremcn to share in the gains.

A union committee reported: "Our

present policy can be described as one of intermittent guer:·illa warfare directed against all changes which we anticipate will reduce the
need for men. 1129 Hodification of the policy, the union felt, would be
more beneficial to the membership. 30

Harry R. Bridges, the president

union, said to the.representative of the elTIJ}loyers:
A union leader has a right to fight for featherbedding until an employer sits dNm and works out
a scheme for taking care of the men. Try to change
the work rules and ue 1 11 call a strike, We'll
hold out for three months-four, if necessary.
\·le'll cost you maybe 70 million dollars. ;·Jhy don't
you take half of that and put it in a fund to
protect the men's jobs as you mechanize? i',ny don't
you share the savings?31

29

The Hew York Times, Eay 27, 1963, P• 15 :2.

301.inco1n Fairley, "The IL\'/U-Pi!A Hechanization and Hodernizaagreement, 11 Labor Law J ournal, July, 1961, P• 669,
~ester Velie, "That Empty Chair by the Featherbed, 11 The
Reader's Digest, April, 1963, P• 100.

<'..L

The problems were ex[ilored with the employer's association
that year and in 1956.

The labor contract negotiated in 1959 provid-

ed that for the contract year of 1959-1960 employers were free to
mechanize without fear of r;estraint from the union, although they could
make no changes in work practices.

During this period a method was

devised to measure manhours saved under new techniques to provide a
basis for future sharing of the gains.

Eean1-1hile the employers agreed

to pay $1,500,000 into a fund to provide a guaranteed annual wage and

..
t 32
early reciremen.

Since this agreement a more substantive contract

has emerged baaed on the "buy-out" principle instead of "gains-share".
The employers were most arncious to get the 1960 agreement
because the Hest Coast longshoremen were very much against reducing
the size of the regular work force.
but not far enough in fact.

The agreement 1rent far in principle,

Prin~ipally, the union agreed in this

contra.ct to eliminate casual workers and those who leave the work force.
But in the main, it kept the basic group at work, regardless of methods

or :improvements.
In effect, the West Coast agreement provides a "permanent bonus
to employees to refrain f~om opposing tech,'1olosical progress, ,,3 3
Involved in this provision is 11hat amounts to a dismissal compensation
concept, providing payments for employees to seek work elsewhere,
The fund could have had bad effects in practice.

The mainten-

ance of the existing labor force, except for attrition, will undoubtedly raise the·average age of the employees, thus reducing efficiency
32Kossoris,
.
.
p.
·

5•

33
0. F. Bloom and H,R, Northrup, Economics of Labor Relations,.
(Homewood, Illinois: Irwin, Inc., 1961) P• 259
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in an industry that requires much physj_cal effort.

Over-manning 1-Till

probably also continue.
Though the agreement has some undesirable features, it neverthe-less, is still' a giant step' toward solving the problem and changing
the attitudes of unions to,-rard technological change.

Neither the

employer group nor the union has a good measure of uhat the modernization program 1-1ill mean in terms of man-hours saved.
fast nor how far the program will move.

No one !mows how

Estimates of the reduction of

man-hour requirements have gone as high as 35% by the end of the agree-_
ment•s life. 34
Significantly, the IUJU achieved all of the changes through
peaceful negotiations at the bargaining table.
Adjustment and Contr:ol
For more than eighty years, the practice of
prohibiting the use of b9:;'ro11ed type without
reproduction has been an accepted part of the
labor-management relationship in the printing
and publishing indust!"J• All acceptable relationships between employers and the International
'.l'ypographical Union ( ITU) have gro,-m out of long
years of experience, 2nd have been considered from
most angles at the bargaining table. Common
problems and contrbversial matters have been
negotiated in an air of mutual concern, seeking a
fair solution; these often have involved trial-anderror projects, concessions made to equalize
benefits gained and adoption and adaption of new
ideas to meet changing conditions as often as
deemed necessary or advisable by agreement of
both parties.35

3 ' ossoris,
.
p. 7 •

35Excerpts

from a speech presented by 1>/oodruff Randolph, President of the International Typographical Union before the House
Committee on Education and Labor and the Senate Cor.imittee on Labor and
Public Helfare, during hearings on amendments to the Tai't-Hartley Act,
83rd Congress.
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The possibilities of transferring matter which had_ been used
from one office to another and thereby reducing the outlay for composition must always have been apparent to the publishers of newspapers.
The local unions, doubtless, had cases of this kind to deal with at a
very early tir.1e, yet the subject did not attract nuch attention until
after the Civil War,

The·1S69 session of ITU rejected a resolution
36
directing local unions to oppose the borrowing of matter.
This action

was not the result of any opposi~ion to the principle involved, but
rather of the reluctance of the International, at that period in its
history, to interfere in local questions.

There is ample ground for

believing that at the time local unions very generally opposed the
borrowing of matter; and three years later, in 1872, a committee of
the International expressly declared its opinion that the transfer of
matter Has "detrimental to both proprietor an?- printer and should not
be alloHed."3?

In 1873 The International adopted a resolution "dis-

countenancing the.practice prevailing in several cities of loaning and
,
•
• newspaper II • 38
mat'cer b et ween morning
an d evening
b arrowing

As

th e rul e

has been enforced since that time, the exchange of matter is prohibited
are printed in the same office and a.med by the
person.

About 1870 the use by neuspapers in the smaller to1ms of ,,hat
kno,m as "patent outsides" became corr.man.

These were sheets printed

3 ,foodruff Randolph, "Reproduction in the Printing and PublishIndustr-,1, 11· Labor Lai-1 Journal, !fay, 1953, PP• 307-JOS.
37George E. Barnett, 11 The Printers", American Economic AssociaQuarterly, Third Series, X, No. 3 (October, 1909), P• 435 •
. 38Ibid.
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on one side and fu~nished by a singl~ printing office to a number of
newspaper publishers.

The central office printed thousands of these

sheets from the same type, and sold them in small lots to its customers.
The local publishers printed the other side of the sheets in their mm
offices.

The n2wspapers Hhich used "outsides" were almost exclusively

weeklies published in to.-m·s too small to have local typographicc,l unions.
The union, therefore, never showed a keen interest in the subject,
although it Has occasionally considered.
During the earlier years of ITU, reproduction was not practiced.
The loaning ond borrowing of type 1ms prohibited by mutual agreement.
The law and the agreement dealt only with type and type setting.

Before·

the turn of the centiIT'J, new machines were invented, new methods were
brought into use, and neH problems confronted both proprietors and
printers in their collective bargaining.

Hand-set type uas being re-

placed with composition from !1onotype and Linotype machines.

Sterotype

and electrotype plates, photo-engravings and papier mache matrices were
widely used.
During this periocl of rapid ex,,ansion and changes within the
printing and publishing industry, collective bargaining as to the exact
terms and specific policies to be followed in each local jurisdiction
becclllle more important and minimum standards as expressed by ITU general
lairs ·were stated in greater detail.

,,fuen unions seek control over the jobs created by a neu 12.borsaving machine or device, they aro usually interested primarily in
obtaining these jobs for the men displaced by the new technique.

Their

success in achieving this purpose depends in the main upon five conditions: (l) the usefulness of skiil and e:;,_-:perience aco_uired under the old

25
technique to holders of jobs under the new, (2) the bargaining position
of the union, (3) the willingness of the union to make concessions to
obtain control of new jobs, (4) the relations between the union and the
employers, and

(5)

the uillingness of the displaced men to learn the

new techniques promptly and to do their best at it.

39

The success of

the ITU in controlling the linotype--the classic instance of the successful pursuit of the policy of control--is largely e:h'"J)lained by the fact
'
that
employers early discovered that the compositors lmouledge and train-

ing made him a more satisfactory operator than workers ,mo lacked
experience in setting newspaper matter.
Even where men experienced at the old technique .make the most
satisfactor.f workmen on the neu, the bargaining power of the 11,'rion may
be important in gaining for the displaced employees an opportunity to

show what they can do.

At the time
new technfoues
are introduced,
.
.

employers may not lmov whether e:h-perience at the old process is valuable
at the ne,.;,

Certainly the Typographical Union was greatly helped in

preventing employers from embarking on attempts to train specialists for
the linotype by the fact that many jobs such as the setting of advertisements, ,;ere not affected by the machine,

No less important was the fact

that many jobs such as the setti<"lg of advertisements, were not affected
by the machine.

No less important was the fact that linotypes were

first introduced in neHspaper offices where the union was the strongest,
Strikes are costly to neuspapers because the failure of a paper
39 Slichter, p, 246,

4oG,E,

Barnett, "Chapters on HachinerJ 2nd Labor," p, 19, as
quoted in Slichter, p, 21.iB,

40
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to appear inflicts on it an irretrievable loss of advertising revenue.
And if the paper is produced by strikebreakers, many advertisers refuse
to patronize it for fear of incurring the enmity of the strikers and
their sympathizers.

Newspapers too, are highly vulnerable to boycotts.

Since the circulation depends upon popularity, newspapers are reluctant
to offend the wage earners of the community by becoming involved in
serious labor trouble_.

Finally, the expense of setting the type for a

l,arge edition of a newspaper is too small a part of the cost of production to Harrant an expensive battle. hl

These factors, by strengthening

the bargaining power of The T°'Jpographical Union, helped to forestall the.
move of managenent to train specialists for the linotype.
embarked upon a training progrem of its

The union

01·m.

Elmer Brown, ITU President, in a speech to the American Newspaper Publishers Association Convention in April 1965, states:
The union printers, after quickly recovering
from their first shock, determined that their
future lay in mastering the ne1,r machines, not
fighting them. The lesson learned by both labor
and management in the replacing of hand-set conposition uith the machine method should serve as a
parallel to the era of automation and the computer •
• • • We are making. every effort to train our members to operate new electronic cbvices which you
are introducing in your newspapers. • • • In addition to training our representatives and staff
members to better understai.'1d your problems, we
have embarked on a program which, i.,e hope, ,rill
provide you 1':ith ?- ready source of competent,
trained personnel whenever you decide to introduce new innovations in your composing rooms.
•
•
we are
0 Reg2.rdless of IJhat you may thinl(,
grmm-up boys now and we realize fu1-ly that if
you don·•t prosper, then neither will we.
Slichter, p. 2h9.
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The ITU has consistently opposed the four devices .( "Borro1dng
Natter," "Patent Outsides," "Pl:i.te Hatter, 11 "l,,'xchange of Matrices")
for the reuse or duplication of matter,

Where the use of plates or

the exchange of matter has ' been permitted, it has been because conditions uere too strong for the union to overcome.

The underlying motive

in the opposition to such.labor saving devices has been the desire to
prevent the displacement of labor; but the attitude of opposition had
its inception in certain peculia,:ities of the S'Jstem of piece payment
long in vogue in the newspaper business.

It is to be expected that as.

time lapses such survivals in attitude will lose their force.

The

prohibition against the various forms of the reuse and duplication of
matter will then rest, if still enforced, purely on the desire to
increase the amount of em,Jloyment,
In general the ITU accepts the inevi~able advancement in
technology and channels its energy touard continued control of the
industry through established training programs for its members to meet
head-on the challenge of the future.
Opposition and Competition
Lumbering along a street in Washington, an old railroad fireman named H. B. Gilbert recalled his private meeting ,Iith the President
of the United States earlier that day.

Gilbert turned to his companion,

"You know, 11 he said, ""today's events make me prouder than ever that I
am an American.

1-Jhere else in the world could an old country boy like

me say 'No, 1 to t~e President and then walk out of his office?Ji.

2

As president.of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firer:ien and

2Time Hagazine, July 26, 1963, P• 13,
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Enginemen, Gilbert_ has been simply .a preserver of past union gains.
In a speech to the Brotherhood convention, July 1963, he characteristically called upon the members to confront the crisis of
lie m~ant not 1973, but 1873. 43

the "spirit of '73"•

the Brotherhood was founded..

1

63 with

That was the year

An Erie Railroad fireman was killed in a

train wreck, and a railroading f_riend named Joshua Leach set about taking
up a collection for the widow and children.

From this beginning he

formed a fireman's life insuranc~ association with eleven members Hho
called themselves the

D-eer Park Lodge No. 1. 11 'From this beginning

1.1

grew the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen.
In 1877, members of the young union took part in the United
States I first nationwide strike, which erupted when depression-hit
railroads imposed wage cuts.

Railroad workers struck in Baltimore,

Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Reading; Louisville, and Chicago.

Strikers

destroyed locomotives, fought with anti-strike citizens, but finally
gave up after battling state and Federal troops.

Chastened by bloodshed

and defeat, the Firemen two yea:c-s later adopted a resolution declaring
that the union would

11

ign~re strikes and hereafter settle our grievan-

ces with our employers by arbitration. 11 44
The long history of railroading in the United States has seen
only one partly successful.attenpt to gather all railroad workers into
a single industrial union,

That was The .American Railway Union (ARU)

founded in 1B93 by fiel"J Socialist Eugene Debs.
3Ibid.
hlirbid. P•

14.

The membership rose to

29
about 150,000 and was a boisterous but confident organization.

On

!fay ll, 1894, Debs called out the workers in Chicago's Pullman shops,
and the result uas one of the bloodiest strikes in United States histocy.
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Both the Brotherhood and the railroads reached their. peak in

the decade before 1920.

Since then the companies have been afflicted

with competition from the trucking industry and the rail unions uith
creeping obsolescence.
only 78,000. today.

The BofLF&E had 126,000 members in 1920, but

If it uere not for the

11

work rules" that railroads ·

want to get rid of, union membership would be even smaller.

46

Although the various branches of the transportation industry
have expi,rienced considerably different bargaining relationships,
i

almost all of them have been subject to many make-work practices.

The

most publicized and bitterest featherbedding dispute has occurred on
the railroads, where employers have coordinated their efforts fully
and effectively.

ElseI1here labor and ma.nagement have not met in simi-

lar head-on struggles.
One of the major problems faced by the whole transportation
industry in the 1960 1 s is caused by the lack of un:i.on responsibility
for holding operating costs dmm.

Labor organizations have not been

sufficiently concerned to maYj]nize labor productivity and have resist-

.

·.

ed service adjustments based on user demand and changing technology.

47

I Ibid.

46Ibid~
47Kent

T. Hecly, 11 The Problem-Rational and Effective Allocation
of Resources, 11 The Annals of the American Acadeny of Political and
Social Science, Januar'J 1963, p. l.i4.
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The tendency to impose inflexible ,rnd complicated work rules restricting output and operations and reducing the carriers' ability to render
efficient service generally permeates transportation labor unions.4

8

The rules. and practices under which operating railroad workers
in the United states are assigned their tasks and paid for their service have been developed during a period extending over 100 years.
Lack of ir,',mediate supervision called for detailed rules.

Since 1875,

when the first simple railroad contract was put in written form, the
rules have grmm in ·scope and extensiveness and are now incorporated
in elaborate and complex collective agreements.

The different practices

did not all come about from collective bargaining.

Many originated in

decisions of courts, executive agencies, and arbitration bodies.
resulted from federal and state legislatio.n.

Others

A general examination and

evaluation of wages and hours in the railroad ·industry, 1-fnich shed much
light on operations, was made at the direction of Congress in connection with the Adainson Eight Hour Act of 1916. 49

Prevalent rules and

practices were codified by the United State,s Railroad Administration
during and immediately afwr World War I.

Since then, changes have

taken place within the framework uhich uas thus established.
The railroad industry was one of the first to be thoroughly
organized by unions, and employees achieved relatively good working
conditions long before uorkers in other sectors of the economy were
able to obtain them.

But the gains of railroad workers have lagged

since World War II.

During the past twenty years other labor organ-

izations have been able to negotiate great iI1provenents in frinee
4BMarvin 1. Fair and Ernest W. Hilli3Il1s, Jr., lcconomics of
Transportation, 1950, P• 618
49united States Eight-Hour Commission, P~port,.1918, as quoted
in I,,iter, P• 73.
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Benefits, while railroads have not been ver-<J successful in this area.
Vast economic changes have in many ways adversely affected
the position of the railroad industr-~.

Reduced profits for many carriers

and losses for others have stimulated the search for techniques to
lower costs.

It is natural, m1der such conditions, that much attention

has been directed toward labor outlays which amount to more than half
the total operating revenues of railroads and have been a greater
fraction of total costs, despite -the alJ1lost consistent decline in
employment over the past forty years. 50

In 1920 railroads were pract-

ically unchallenged as carriers of freight and passeng~rs.51
that time competition has intensified.

Since

Automobiles, trucks, buses,

airplanes, ships, and pipelines have garnered ever larger shares of
the passenger and freight business.
'.I'echnological developments, competitive pressures, and the
severe and prolonged economic depression uhicp began in 1929 all contributed to the continued decline in railroad employment (except for
the uar years) that started in 1920.

Between 19L,8 and 1960 the number

of jobs for operating workers--engineers, firemen, conductors, brakemen,
and switchtenders--fell from about 300,000 to 200,000, though the relative decline for nonoperating workers was much greater.5 2
Featherbedding on. the railroads stems from uork rules which
have become obsolete because they have hardly been altered since they
were develo:[Jed more than forty years ago.
0
Leiter, p. 72
51
52

Ibid. p. 73
Toid. P• 73

"Full crew" laws in alJ1lost
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half the states specify the number of brakemen and other crew positions
required on freight and passenger trains.

Interpretation of contract

provisions and work rules by arbitrators and referees have modified
the original intent of agreements and forbidden some labor-saving

Although negotiated rules and state laws have provided most of
the employment which is in dispute, decisions of the National Railroad
Adjustment Board (NRAB), which handles grievances in the railroad industry, are responsible for some of it.

Many rigidities in job assigrnnents

of road and yard crews have resulted from contract interpretations
made by the NRAB.

On the basis of seniority rules, for example, the

Board adopted the policy of assigning property rights to work.

Each

piece of work belongs to a class of labor, a member of which must be
called upon to perfonn it, regardl~ss of 1-mether it can be performed
more expeditiously and efficiently by others,

This has provided work

for yard crews even where yards have been abolished,53
In 1956 railroads, acting jointly, announced their intentions
of revising the work rules and the wage-base formula th2.t the union
· had won over the years,

The railroads claimed that the old rules and

formulas, largely anttquated by technological cha_~ges, burdened railroads
with additional and unnecessary costs of $600 million a year,54
The most notorious instance of featherbedding by the operating
railroad employees has been the requirement that an excessive nuJnber
of workers should be employed,

The fonnal beginning of this dispute

3Slichter, p,· 195,
54Time, July 26, 1963, Vol, 82, No, 1, p, 13,
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came on November 2, 1959, when because of Section 6Q of the Railway
Labor Act, the carriers served the organizations with notices of proposed changes in many work and compensation rules, including those
bearing on the fireman and'crew consist issues,

The President of the

United States appointed the.Presidential Railroad Commission in November
1960, to inquire into the disput~,

In March 1963, the Supreme Court

decided that the railroads, • , ~having exhausted all of the statutory
procedures.I) are relegated to self:-help in adjusting this dispute,
subject o?Lly to the invocation of the provisions,. , .for the creation·
of an Emergency Board.,"55
This Board (created under provisions of Railway Labor Act on
April

3, 1963) devoted its efforts almost entirely to the mediation of

the dispute, seeking as it said, "constructive solutions rather than
the mere restatement of the previously fixed positions of the parties, 11
and exploring

11

paths Hhich may develop into avenues of settlements. n56 .

This Board recommended with regard to each issue a series of guidelines
and procedures which might serve as a framework for further collective
bargaining,

Both as to the fireman issue and the crew consist issue,

the recommended procedure included arbitration as a means of settling
unresolved issues,
Both the Presidential Railroad Commission and Emergency Board
No, 154 have concluded that in most instances firemen are not required
in road freight and yard service.

In addition, several emergency boards

and one arbiration board, although not dealing with the same issue, have
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v, Baltimore a,~d Ohio
Railroad, 327 U,S, 28Lr (1963),
6
5 Public Law 88-108, 88th Congress, S, J, Res, 102, enacted
August 28, 1963,
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ruled adverse}y on related proposals by the Brotherhood of.Locomotive
Engineers.5 7 Eiren today negotiations between the railroads and unions
are snarled, threatening the nation with a crippling rail strike.

Six

shop-craft unions are demanding a 7;l pay hike while the railroads are
offering a

5%

boost.

The Government has already involked the Railroad

Labor Acts' 60 day grace period (runs to Hay 3, 1967), to prevent a
strike and now is helpless to act beyond presidential persuasion or
special authority from Congress or the courts.5

8

The controversy concerning the appropriate nu."ber of operating
employees to man the railroads, uhich began in 1959, is nou more than
six years old.

While the carriers are now in a much stronger position,

they still face legal battles and collective bargaining struggles before
.they can completely eliminate "unnecessary" employees and before the
prevalent attitudes of the railroad unions ch3c-nge.
Summary
In general, unions have not been able to prevent technological
advance by opposition, except temporari}y or localJ.y.

Indeed, restrict-

ions and high wage demands. have sometimes induced change.

The tendency

has been for unions to adjust to change and seek to control it under
policies which assu."e that high wages and low labor costs should be
achieved simult2neously.
demonstrated historical}y.

The fruitlessness of resistance has been ~"p}y
The growth of industrial unionism and the

broadening of craft union jurisdiction have influenced union outlook.
The labor movement, recognizing the inevitability of change and the
?Ibid. P• 12.
5BTime, April 14, 1967, ·vol. 89 No. 15 P• 35.
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are snarled, threatening the nation Ir:i.th a crippling rail strike.

Six

shop-craft unions are demanding a 7% pay hike while the railroads are
offering a 5% boost.

The Government has already involked the Railroad

Labor Acts' 60 day grace period (runs to Hay 3, 1967), to prevent a
strike and, now is helpless to act beyond presidential persuasion or
special authority from Congress or the courts.5

8

The controversy concerning the appropriate nu."ber of operating
employees to man the railroads, uhich began in 1959, is nou more than
six years old.

While the carriers are now in a much stronger position,

they still face legal battles and collective bargaining struggles before
.they can completely eliminate "unnecessary" employees and before the
prevalent attitudes of the railroad unions cha,-nge.
Summary
In general, unions have not been able to prevent technological
advance by opposition, except temporarily or locaJJ.y.

Indeed, restrict-

ions and high wage demands. have sometimes induced change.

The tendency

has been for unions to adjust to change and seek to control it under
policies which assu."e that high wages and low labor costs should be
achieved simult2neously.
demonstrated historically.

The fruitlessness of resistance has been amply
The growth of industrial unionism and the

broadening of craft union jurisdiction have influenced union outlook.
The labor movement, recognizing the inevitability of change and the
?Ibid. P• 12.
5BTime, April 14, 1967, Vol. 89 No. 15 P• J5.
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futility of resistance should therefore, curb its impulses.
Attempts by the union to exert control over employment opportunities uhen technological displacement occurs have been haropered by
jurisdictional disputes over work, particularly among craft unions.
These controversies have made it difficult for any one union to work
out an agreement with employe,cs regarding job control.

The situation

has been further aggravated in some instances Hhen technological· advance has changed the nature of the .tasks, because the narr01I basis of
craft unionism has l,imited the scope of duties which Irorkers are expected to perform.

Furthermore, as a matter of policy employers have

sometimes resisted union claims for jurisdiction of new types of work
evolving from technological change.
Union efforts to increase the degree of employment security
enjoyed by uorkers have been supported
in part. by those employers who
believe that insecure workers are prone to be less efficient.

In try:-

ing to control and adapt to technological change, unions have sought
to protect employ1nent opportunities, earnings, and the conditions of
work of their members.

Although these efforts are similar to those

,lhich unions make in connection with all collective bargaining negotiations for the improvement of uorking conditions, the policies dealing
with machine displacement have a number of unique characterisitics.
Attempts to min:L-nize displacements have involved union concern with
factors relating to limitations on work loads, transfer to other jobs,
retraining, regulating the rate at which machines are introduced,
controlling the number of neu entrants to the trade, reduction in hours,
and maintenance of earnings.

Unions have also tried to attain g,ceater

security and job tenure for members through seniority arrangements and

work guarantees,

Determination of the work load deals mainly with the

intensity of labor and has often been linked by unions to the health
of workers and the safety of operations,

In actuality, however, it

sometimes involved maintenance of employment in the form of featherbedding.

The other goals represent more legitimate attempts to allev-

iate distress brought on by technological advance.
Except for the decade of the 1930's, the leadership of the
.American labor movement has remained firm against restriction of output and resistance to teehnological advance,

John Mitchell, president

of the coal miners I union, Hrote at the turn of the Twentieth Century
that production difficulties arise from the attitude of employers that
'

workers should be paid as lHtle as possible for the maximum amount
of work, and the responding reaction of employees to offer as little
· work as possible for the highest 1-rage that can- be obtained,

But he

added that policies of American unions generally are not restrictive;
he stated: "The slogan of the trade unionist should be, and is, a fair
day's work for a fair day's wage, 11 59
Samuel Gompers plainly indicated on numerous occasions that the
labor movement must not struggle against technological advance,

In

his autobiography he relates that he learned the futility of opposing
technological progress about 1669 when the cigar makers I union lost a
hard fought strike against the introduction of molds and bunch-breaking machines in the industry. 6o

In 1919 Gompers wrote : "The working

9
John Hitchell, Organized Labor, 1903, pp. 254-255.
60

samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor, Volume 1,
1925, P• 47,
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people of the Unit'.'Jd States, have never considered, much less adopted,
a policy of limitation of output, and in the last twenty years not even
has any appreciable group of uorkers ;followed any such policy.

It is

,

•• • .foreign to the ,,hole code of ethics of the organized labor move11 61

111ent.

Ten years later, William Green, Gompers' successor as presi-

dent of the American Feder-ation ,if Labor, said: "•

• •

.the American

labor movement welcomes the installation and extension of the use of
machinery in the industry. 1162

In the 19 JO I s, however, the AF.L contend-

ed that the principal cause of unemployment was technological displace-·
ment, and that congressional investigations to study the problem should
be held, so that actions to reduce distress might be taken.

John L.

Lewis and Philip Hurray, the first and second presidents of the Congress
of Industrial Organizatio~ (CIO), nevertheless felt that employers should
6
be ;free to introduce new machinery. 3

George .Heany, current president

of the AF.L-CIO, has said that the labor movement recognizes the advantages of automation and does not want to stop progress; it wants only
to minimize social and economic dislocations. 6 4

1

samuel Gompers, ·111:fuo Limits Output?" International ]folders
Journal, November, 1919, P• 879.
62
6

The Bridge Hen's Magazine, April, 1929, P• 228.

3Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, Vol. l,
United Nine Workers of America. p. 207.

64
p.

76.
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Bill Davidson, "Fear of Automation, 11 Look, April 25, 1961,

.

,
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CONCLUSION
The reaction of workers to changes that are potentially job
displacers is usually negative.

For people who have gro,m up in an

era when workers are always pressing for greater material rewards and
encroaching further into managerial prerogatives, it is important to
understand that in featherbedding or make-work rules, the uorker' s
position is basically defensive--aimed prir~arily at maintaining the
status quo.
The problem of the displaced is real, in economic as well as
psychological terms.

The loss of face that accompanies job loss leads

to, or is associated with, a psychological 'deterioration of the family
unit, and a consequent lowering of status in the conmmnity.

These

problems are not easily overcome; and for senior workers the geographical or occupational chan1:se which may be necessary to combat the displacement is often too gr')at.

Therefore, the worker--with his vested

interest in his job--the union, management, and the government must
share the burdens of technological displacements.
Adjusting to technological change places responsibilities upon
all groups affected by the change.

In exercising the right to innovate,

management also acquired a responsibility of providing information to
employees to allay their fears and to provide time for individual
adjustments and for fashioning programs to cushion the shock of change
, for the employees.

Unions shoRld cooperate with management in working'

out such progra~s, rather than engaging in self-defeating resistance
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to them.

Government has the major responsibility for following policies

which promote economic expansion and thus create sufficient jobs for a
growing labor force.

It must also spur retraining and labor force

mobility, so that jobs and uorl:ers are brought together quickly.

The

efforts of labor and management, together with those of government, can
provide aid to the individual uorker in his adjustment to a changed
economic and technological envirom1ent.

It is the worker's responsibil-

ity, however, to respond to change by reaching out for neu job opportunities, even if this reQuires relocation, or retraining and education~
Labor unions have a moral obligation and a practical stake, no
less than management does, in easing the impact of technological advance on workers, and in seeking ways to provide a living for those
whose jobs are lost to machines.

So far many labor unions have not been

particularly inclined to shoulde:r their share bf the responsibility in
working out long-run solutions to the problems of technological displacement.

The moves many unions have made have been ,rith the narrow and

selfish objective of "getting ours now" through short-run agreements
that protect current workers but toss future workers on their

01-m.

The cost of featherbedding cannot accurately be estimated,
The greatest waste probably results from the informal make-work practices prevalent among all uorkers, unorganized as well as organized,
Even if attention is confined to the formal make-uork rules of unions,
the task is not much easier,

Both the principle and practices nere

consciously accepted by management in retuo."Il for concessions deemed to

be of eouaJ. or greater v&.lue.
The popular feeling that there is somc>thing immoral about
featherbedding may appropriately be described as a selective revu.1sion
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to unearned incrempnt, not elsewhere observable in the economy.

In

essence, hmmver, featherbedding demands are wage demands; in terms of
cost make-uork practices are no different from paid rest or lunch periods
and many other "fringes. n
workers affected.

This is clearly recognized by employers and

In the ne1,spaper publishing industry, for example,

proposals that the practice of setting ttbogus 11 be abandoned have always
been accompanied by offers to increa.se the hourly wage rate.

To this

observation the almost invariable res,Jonse is that it would make far
better sense to do just that: abandon the practice and increase the rate
for doing productive ..;ork.

Of course it would, just as it would be much·

wiser in certain periods for unions to moderate their wage demands and
for manufacturers to lower their prices and for banks to raise or lower
their interest rates and so on, ad infinitum.· The point is that our
'
economy does not operate on the principle
that the Government first

decides what is the most sensible policy for each group to adopt and
then directs that these policies by put into effect.

In theory, and

ver;1 largely in practice, groups maJce their 01m decisions and protect

and advance their respective interests ,rlthin a system of bargaining
and competition.
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